Hamas is OK, You're OK

When I was seven, my dad taught me about the Viet Cong. Although they were very brutal, he said - torture, murdering civilians, terrorism, and all that - they were defending their homeland, and so they couldn't be called "bad guys." He likened the Viet Cong to the Ewoks - plucky low-tech tribalists who weren't afraid to eat a little human flesh, but who in no way deserved to have their forest stomped on by the death machines of the Galactic Empire (it's interesting that, when he made this analogy, my dad had no idea that this had in fact been George Lucas' intent).

I suppose this is what made me a defender of Hamas from an early age. I have dim recollections of arguments during my early teenage years, when someone would say to me "Hamas kills innocent people, so anyone in Hamas is evil," and me replying "No, they're just fighting a war and trying to get a country for themselves." I certainly never approved of Hamas' methods; blowing up schoolbuses is hardly sporting, and nonviolent resistance is the best of all possible strategies for national liberation. And neither did I approve of Hamas' goal of destroying Israel. But I had - and have - a hard time blanketly condemning a group of stateless people fighting for a country of their own.

So it's no surprise that I think this column by Shmuel Rosner is totally wrongheaded, and is in fact exemplary of the totally wrongheaded approach taken by Israel toward the Gaza strip since the withdrawal of 2005. Rosner writes:

Since 2007, the policy of the International Quartet has been to isolate the government that controls Gaza after Hamas forces ousted the forces loyal to the official representative of Palestinians from the Strip in a coup. An ugly and violent coup...

So, there were very good reasons for isolating Hamas and attempting to contain the Gaza Strip. True, the government in charge of Gaza is a headache for Israel. But it is no less of a nuisance to the legitimate representative of the Palestinians—the Palestinian Authority, headed by Mahmoud Abbas. Those who want to strengthen the parties of peace have a choice to make: Recognizing Hamas would signal that the Palestinian Authority could no longer claim to represent the people of Gaza. It would signal that the world is willing to work with a bully, with a group refusing to commit—even rhetorically—to the cause of peace, that it has given up on a better life for the Palestinians of Gaza.

The premises of this argument are that 1) Israel and the international community should act to weaken Hamas vis-a-vis Fatah (the Palestinian Authority) in Gaza, and 2) it is possible to actually do so.

The second of these is obviously wrong. Hamas has triumphed in Gaza - decisively, permanently. It is no longer possible for anyone to bring Fatah back to power there; the key piece of evidence in support of this fact is that Fatah itself is making no effort whatsoever to reestablish control over Gaza. Therefore, there is no alternative to Hamas in the strip. Any successful weakening of Hamas would necessarily leave chaos in its wake, which would lead directly to the rise of even more radical groups like Islamic Jihad.

The first premise - that it is a good idea to weaken Hamas via external pressure - goes against the Westphalian system of national sovereignty. Unless Israel claims Gaza as part of the Israeli nation - which the 2005 withdrawal makes it clear it does not - then Israel has absolutely no right to decide who rules in Gaza. Some have argued for counter-Westphalian interventions on humanitarian grounds, but even those who allow such exceptions must admit that Hamas is not brutalizing the people in the territory under its control.

Thus, the appropriate response to both the withdrawal of 2005 and Hamas' civil war triumph in 2007 is for Israel and the international community to recognize Gaza as an independent state, and to treat Hamas as the legitimate government in Gaza. This is the Westphalian solution, and it is the correct one, for several reasons.

First of all, if Hamas is recognized as a legitimate government, then it has something to lose, because it knows that if peace were established it would be guaranteed continued power. This will make Hamas more willing to recognize Israel sometime in the future, just as the Palestinian Authority (and Israel itself!) abandoned their terrorist roots once they found themselves ruling some territory.

Second of all, recognizing Gaza as an independent nation-state would immeasurably improve Israel's moral standing in the international community, because anti-Hamas actions would then become anti-Gaza actions - a simple war between opposing nation-states, rather than Israel's brutalization of its own non-citizen subjects. If Gazan independence is recognized, and if Israel then retaliates with force for Hamas rocket attacks, then it is simply a case of Country A attempting to destroy Country B, and Country B defending itself with force. The same goes for the Israeli blockade; after all, Britain's historic use of naval blockades against its hostile neighbors was key to its survival for hundreds of years.

But in order to legitimize its attacks on and blockades of Gaza, Israel must make it clear that if Hamas recognizes Israel and stops attacking Israel, then Israel will leave Gaza alone, end its own attacks, and end the blockade. If Israel demands peace, recognition, and respect from Gaza, it must be willing to provide exactly the same thing in return, and to regard Hamas - or any Gazan group that subsequently wrests power from Hamas! - as the political entity with the right to make such a deal.

In other words, "being willing to work with a bully" is what makes the world go 'round. Nation-states almost always begin as brutal gangs, but with recognition and respect, they become quite benign entities. If you don't believe me, examine the history of the UK, with its successive waves of bloody conquest, or America, with its ethnic cleansing of the Native Americans, or Turkey, which began as a foreign army from Central Asia. What pacifies nation-states is not irredentist rejection of once-terrorist governments, but the Westphalian system of national sovereignty and the inviolability of national borders. The Hamas-rejectionists' refusal to recognize Hamas is as idiotic as refusing to recognize the UK because the Normans terrorized the Saxons.

Rosner concludes:

The people who come on ships, who confront the Israeli blockade, who supposedly believe in a better life for the people of Gaza—a better life that they deserve—are signaling to Hamas that with a little more patience, their first goal will be achieved: Hamas' rule in Gaza will be legitimized and Hamas' government will receive aid, material support, visits from world dignitaries, and invitations to attend summits and gatherings.

Yes. And that goal should be not only Hamas', but Israel's and the international community's as well.