Jumat, 30 November 2012

Are foreigners perpetual outsiders in Japan?


Time for a post that's not about economics.

Number 4 on this list of "5 Things Nobody Tells You About Living In Japan" is, in fact, something that almost everybody tells me about living in Japan. Namely, that foreigners will always be outsiders there. I've stopped arguing about this with my friends and acquaintances and drunk people I meet in bars, because frankly the discussion has become repetitive, and I never really manage to convince anyone of my point of view. (I felt like I was constantly screaming "There...are...four...lights!!!")

So I thought instead I'd write it down.

Here's what the article has to say about life as a foreigner in Japan:

Simply put, the country just isn't very accommodating to people who can't speak Japanese. Without the language, you will barely be able to buy food or get around, let alone establish any kind of permanent living situation that doesn't involve keeping a bilingual girlfriend/boyfriend/hostage on hand 24/7 to translate every commercial that comes on the radio. You can't just exchange shouts with people and come to a working understanding like Han Solo and Chewbacca. Real life doesn't work that way. 
So how is that different from moving to any other country where English isn't the native language? Well, for starters, Japanese is one of the hardest languages for Americans to learn, requiring 2,200 hours of study if you want to be considered truly proficient. This is partly because of the difficulties of learning a new language as an adult, and partly because English and Japanese have about as much in common with each other as Halloween and Halloween III. 
That being said, once you actually got the whole language thing down, you might expect to finally be able to integrate yourself into Japanese society and thrive, right? Well, here's how it was with me: I've been coming to Japan for nearly a decade, my wife is Japanese, I speak the language fluently, I know the culture inside and out, and yet I'm still "that foreign guy" to most people here (even the ones who have known me for close to 10 years). 
Japan is one of the most homogenous nations on Earth -- roughly 98 percent of the population is ethnically Japanese. No matter what you do to try and fit in, you will always stick out like a sore thumb in a room full of people who have had their thumbs removed by rototillers. 
For instance, one of the biggest hot button issues in Japan concerns people of Korean ancestry who live in the country. In most cases, these are people who were born in Japan, have Japanese names and speak almost exclusively Japanese, but because of their Korean lineage, they are still legally considered foreigners and as such face several restrictions (such as the inability to vote or hold management positions in the public sector, a law that the Supreme Court actually upheld in 2005). The government literally decided that all Koreans are dastardly shitheads who are not to be trusted and mandated it to the entire country. 
So now ask yourself this -- if the Koreans in this example (who by all rights should be full Japanese citizens were it not for ethnic prejudice) are given the same treatment as convicted felons, what chance does a white kid in a Gundam T-shirt have to not be considered a complete outcast? 
I'm not saying that every single person in Japan hates foreigners, but if you live here, you will be constantly reminded that you are most decidedly not Japanese, nor are you likely to spontaneously become so.
This is pretty typical of stuff I hear from Westerners who have lived in Japan. No, not pretty typical; depressingly, mind-numbingly ubiquitous. It's almost as if Westerners living in Japan are in thrall to some sort of...well, never mind, I shoudn't go there.

Anyway, to put it bluntly, this runs directly counter to my own experience of life as a Westerner in Japan.

I lived in Japan for 2.5 years between college and grad school, and I've been back several times since then, mainly to work at Japanese universities, but also to help my friend make a documentary. The experiment in my job market paper was run at Aoyama Gakuin University in downtown Tokyo. When I showed up in the fall of 2003, my Japanese was pretty rudimentary; I had taken one year of the language in college, but that was it. So I made a concerted effort to learn the language, hanging out around people who spoke no English, reading manga, and memorizing kanji off of the internet. It took about a year and a half before I was really able to carry on an intelligent conversation.

Japanese is not a difficult language. Reading it is difficult, because of the use of Chinese characters. But you can memorize these pretty easily by reading on the Web and using a rollover dictionary like Rikaikun. In fact, this method was suggested to me by my friend Tobias Harris, a political scientist who specializes in the study of Japan. Using this method, he was able to teach himself to read Japanese so well that, after only a year of study, he was able to work as campaign operative for a Japanese politician in Kamakura.

As for the grammar and pronunciation, neither is particularly difficult. Compound and complex sentences are easier to construct than in English; there are fewer verb tenses, and most nouns can easily be made into verbs. Pronunciation is quite simple, as Japanese has only one sound that English doesn't have (a kind of humming "nn" sound). 

Despite the easiness of the Japanese language, many Westerners never bother to become truly fluent. The reason is simple; they can get by in the country speaking simple English and broken, simple Japanese. Of course, as the author of the article above suggests, this makes it difficult to really relate to most of the people in Japan. It makes it tough to form close relationships, tough to be included in social activities, and tough to work productively with Japanese coworkers. But because Japanese culture is generally friendly, and because some Japanese people take it upon themselves to speak English to foreigners, these Westerners can manage a sort of stunted, good-enough social life over there without ever spending the effort to become fluent. No wonder they feel like outsiders! What would you expect??

So much for the language part. What about the cultural attitudes? The xenophobia, the closed society, the racial homogeneity?

To be perfectly honest, I haven't seen much of it.

These days I go to Japan to work with my coauthors, at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo, and at Osaka University in Osaka. When I'm there, I'm mostly around academics - professors, grad students, and undergrad research assistants. Culturally, they are essentially identical to academic people in the United States (who themselves are usually from a mix of countries). They bemoan stupid politicians. They make nerdy puns. They go rock climbing and biking. They show up to work late and then stay up all night reading papers. They try to eat at interesting restaurants. They read science fiction. They occasionally check out blogs. They politely pretend to follow each other's seminar presentations. In other words, if you are at home in a university setting in America, and if you speak Japanese, you will be at home in a university setting in Japan. And never once has anyone there treated me as an outsider. 

What about other, less intellectual, less cosmopolitan segments of Japanese society? Well, when I lived in Japan the first time, I went to plenty of rock and techno shows. I found the people there to be extremely welcoming and friendly - and not just in a "Wow, look, a white guy came to our show!" kind of way, but in a "Hey, want to hop on scooters go out for a beer?" kind of way. They didn't speak a word of English, they knew hardly any American bands, but they were essentially the same people as the rock hipsters I've hung out with in Los Angeles, Austin, or San Francisco.

Another time, I joined a "yosakoi" dance team - I saw them practicing in the park at about 9 PM, wandered up, and asked if I could join. They said yes. Again, none of them spoke any English, but we got along great. I volunteered at the yearly festival and had a great time, and some of those people became my friends. We'd go out for yakitori (chicken skewers) at 2 AM after we got done practicing.

There are plenty more examples.

Yes, I've met some Japanese people who seem nervous or shy around foreigners, or just plain uninterested. They're not as bad as the Texans who screamed "fag!" at me from the windows of pickup trucks when I was a blue-haired college kid, or my racist Texan junior high teachers. But they did exist. I don't know how many Japanese people there are who don't want to accept foreigners into their social circle, and there's a very good reason I don't know: I don't hang around those people.

Yes, that's right, "people". You see, if you spend your life speaking pidgin Japanese and walking around thinking "I'm a foreigner, I'm an outsider," you can easily fail to realize that Japanese people, despite their vaunted "racial homogeneity", are just as heterogeneous in terms of their tastes and attitudes and personalities as Americans or Canadians or Australians. As in so many situations, individual differences matter far more than group differences. And if you're walking around Japan feeling a wall of alienation between you and everyone you meet, chances are it's due to the cultural prejudices of one specific individual: you.

Oh, and as for that legendary prejudice against Koreans, it is true that Japan doesn't have birthright citizenship. But in no way are "zainichi Koreans" prevented from becoming Japanese citizens. If you are born in Japan to non-citizen residents, you have the option of becoming a Japanese citizen when you reach adulthood. I have a couple friends who did that, in fact. No, Japan is not as welcoming to immigrants as America or the rest of the Anglosphere, but few countries are. It is certainly not true that "the government literally decided that all Koreans are dastardly shitheads". That's just trumped-up BS disguised as a lame, misplaced attempt at humor.

So there you have it. The myth that foreigners can never be accepted in Japanese society is, to all the evidence of my eyes, a myth.

These sort of myths about Japan are common. For example, I've had lots of Westerners insist to me - absolutely insist! - that Japanese people use the word "gaijin" ("foreigner") only to refer to non-Japanese people, even when abroad. Yet I've asked a number of Japanese people living in America: "Are you a 'gaijin'?" And every single one of them has immediately answered "Yes." (Although one did take care to point out to me that "gaikokujin" is a more polite term). So there you go. There...are...four...lights!!!

Anyway, my apologies to everyone who comes to this blog looking to read about economics. I just needed somewhere to vent. Now, instead of getting into the same old argument about Japanese "xenophobia", I can just link to this post.

(Oh, and by the way. #3 on that list was "Hospitals are closed on evenings and weekends." Hey dude, have you ever tried to go to a doctor on the weekend in America? Good luck! Try the Emergency Room instead. Which is open in Japan 24/7, just like in America. They even have their own version of "ER".)


Update: The more time I spend in Tokyo, the more I start to think that maybe my perspective just comes from having spent most of my Japan time in Osaka.

Selasa, 27 November 2012

Bob Lucas on macro


I find Bob Lucas more intriguing than any other economist of the last few decades. I'm always interested to read what he has to say, for example in this recent interview (hat tip to Steve Williamson). Some excerpts, and my quick reactions follow. Here's Lucas on the Lucas Critique:
[T]he term "Lucas critique" has survived, long after [the] original context has disappeared. It has a life of its own and means different things to different people. Sometimes it is used like a cross you are supposed to use to hold off vampires: Just waving it it an opponent defeats him. Too much of this, no matter what side you are on, becomes just name calling.
This is basically what I was conjecturing in this blog post. Of course Lucas gets to say it more matter-of-factly, because...well, his name is on the Critique. Anyway, here's Lucas on DSGE modeling:
Virtually all macroeconomic models today are dynamic, stochastic and general equilibrium (where here "general equilibrium" means you have the same number of equations and unknowns)...If we narrow the definition of DSGE by using "general equilibrium" to refer to competitive or Nash equilibria where the strategy sets of each agent are made explicit in an internally consistent way then we have Kydland-Prescott and other RBC descendants and not much else.
This is interesting, for several reasons. One is that Lucas expands the definition of "general equilibrium" to include Nash equilibria, which is not the way I've ever seen it done; I have always understood the term "general equilibrium" to be synonymous with "Walrasian equilibrium".

Also, it's interesting that Lucas says that RBC models are essentially the only equilibrium models (of the business cycle, presumably) in which "the strategy sets of each agent are made explicit in an internally consistent way". Is this true? I don't think it is true. For example, take a Calvo model. In a Calvo, model, agents' ability to set prices is restricted by a mysterious, exogenous "Calvo Fairy"...but, given the existence of such a "Fairy", the strategy sets of agents in the model are quite explicit and quite internally consistent. In a Prescott-type RBC model, agents' decisions are constrained by exogenous "technology"; you might think that this is more plausible of an assumption than a "Calvo Fairy", but in terms of its effect on the internal consistency of the strategy sets of the agents in the model, it seems no different.

Or maybe I'm reading Lucas wrong here?

Lucas on the causes of business cycles:
I was [initially] convinced by Friedman and Schwartz that the 1929-33 down turn was induced by monetary factors...I concluded that a good starting point for theory would be the working hypothesis that all depressions are mainly monetary in origin. Ed Prescott was skeptical about this strategy from the beginning... 
I now believe that the evidence on post-war recessions (up to but not including the one we are now in) overwhelmingly supports the dominant importance of real shocks. But I remain convinced of the importance of financial shocks in the 1930s and the years after 2008. Of course, this means I have to renounce the view that business cycles are all alike!
In 1980, Lucas had written:
If the Depression continues, in some respects, to defy explanation by existing economic analysis (as I believe it does), perhaps it is gradually succumbing under the Law of Large Numbers.
But with the post-2008 recession looking so similar to the Depression, it seems to have become clear to Lucas that the Law of Large Numbers will no longer do the trick. There must in fact be two types of recessions, with one (more frequent, less severe) type caused by "real shocks", and the other (rarer, more severe) type caused by "financial shocks". 

That Lucas has now twice changed his ideas about the underlying causes of the business cycle - the most important question in all of business cycle theory - is in my opinion a reason to admire him. When the facts change, Lucas changes his mind, as any scientist should.

Incidentally, the idea that "financial shock" recessions are different would tend to put Lucas more on the Reinhart-Rogoff side of things. Though Lucas doesn't mention here whether he thinks financial-shock recessions should last longer.

But the fact that history can cause even the smartest of macroeconomists to change his mind about the fundamental question of his field not once, but twice over the course of his lifetime is a stark illustration of the poverty of data that business-cycle theorists have to work with. In a sense, all we can do is watch history go by and hope it repeats itself enough for us to get a handle on what's happening.

Finally, Lucas on microfoundations:
The "[micro]foundations" of...models don't guarantee empirical success or policy usefulness. 
What is important...is that if a model is formulated so that its parameters are economically-interpretable they will have implications for many different data sets. An aggregate theory of consumption and income movements over time should be consistent with cross-section and panel evidence...An estimate of risk aversion should fit the wide variety of situations involving uncertainty that we can observe...Estimates of labor supply should be consistent aggregate employment movements over time as well as cross-section, panel, and lifecycle evidence...This kind of cross-validation (or invalidation!) is only possible with models that have clear underlying economics: micro-foundations, if you like. 
This is bread-and-butter stuff in the hard sciences. 
This I completely and utterly agree with. The power of microfoundations is that they allow unification. They give you the hope of explaining many phenomena in terms of one underlying phenomenon. In fact, there really should be no conceptual difference between the terms "microfoundations" and "unification". Microfounded models - when they work -are inherently more useful and powerful than equivalent "ad-hoc" models.

Of course, as Lucas points out, this makes microfounded models inherently more vulnerable to falsification than other models. An "ad-hoc" non-microfounded model only has to explain one thing, but a microfounded model has to explain many things. This means that as soon as the microfounded model fails to explain any one of the things it purports to explain, you have to conclude that the model is flawed, and look for a better model. (In practice of course, not everyone actually does this when they ought to...)

Anyway, it's always valuable and fascinating to read Lucas' thoughts. I seem to agree with him on quite a number of important things, though not on issues related to the assumptions or the value of the RBC modeling paradigm...Not that many people especially care whether I agree with Bob Lucas, mind you, but hey, it's my blog!

Minggu, 25 November 2012

Keynes Hayek, by Nicholas Wapshott


I just finished listening to Keynes Hayek: The Clash that Defined Modern Economics, by Nicholas Wapshott. You won't learn much economics from this book, which is mostly an account of the lives and labors of its two protagonists. But you will learn a lot about what economic debate was like back in the 1920s and 1930s, and you will gain some interesting hints about the intersection between science, politics, and personal egos.

Many of the debates between Keynes, Hayek, and other economists working in the UK at the time were carried out in the pages of economics journals, in particular Economica. Hearing these debates summarized and quoted in Wapshott's book, I was immediately struck by how similar they were to today's econ blog debates. There was a huge amount of people talking past each other, quibbling over definitions, and claiming that they'd been misinterpreted. For example, the incredibly byzantine debate between Hayek and Piero Sraffa put me in mind of the Sumner/Wren-Lewis blog debate from early 2012. The sarcastic, bombastic clash of tempers between Keynes, Hayek, and others like Lionel Robbins and Joan Robinson reminded me distinctly of the recent rhetorical fireworks between Paul Krugman, John Cochrane, and others (with Arthur Pigou playing the part of Tyler Cowen, chiding the other debaters for their incivility while advancing conservative ideas in a genteel fashion).

There are some major differences, of course, between the discourses of then and now. The fiery econ debates of the early 20th century advanced a lot more new ideas, and employed more rigorous analysis, than today's blog debates. Steve Williamson often says that you won't learn any cutting-edge economics from reading blogs; but for the back-and forth debates of the 1930s, that was definitely not the case. These days, of course, ground-breaking theories and rigorous analysis have remained in academic journals, and have taken on a far more detached, scientific tone, while sharp debates have mostly moved to the blogs.

As for Keynes and Hayek, the book taught me much more about the latter than the former. Hayek didn't start out as the Anti-Keynes, it turns out - he was a ringer, brought in by Lionel Robbins, William Beveridge, and other British conservatives to battle Keynes when Robbins & co. felt that they themselves weren't up to the task. They brought in Hayek when their first choice, Ludwig von Mises, proved to be too bad at English (and too downright grumpy).

It seems to me that Hayek took his appointed role as the Anti-Keynes a bit too seriously. During his attempt to formulate alternatives to Keynes' General Theory, Hayek repeatedly flirted with ideas that were - in my opinion - much deeper than the simple theory of aggregates that was being advanced by Keynes. These included the mutual inconsistency of economic plans, and the potential failure of economies to reach stable equilibria. Maybe Hayek bit off more than he could intellectually chew, or maybe he shied away from exploring ideas whose implications ran so counter to the political views of his mentor, von Mises. But in any case, Hayek didn't follow up on his tentative forays into the economics of complexity, instability, and disequilibrium, and instead went into political philosophy.

Hayek's most famous piece of political philosophy was, as we now know, completely wrong. In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek claimed that Keynesian-style macroeconomic management would lead to totalitarianism; in reality, nothing of the sort has ever happened. America, Europe, Japan, Korea, and others became solidly Keynesian after World War 2, and while macroeconomic management didn't always work as advertised, it nowhere and never led to the advent of totalitarian regimes.

It's also interesting that Hayek, despite hating the Nazis and totalitarianism in general, seems to have been somewhat influenced by many of the early 20th century Central European ideas that led to the rise of Nazism itself. For example, he repeatedly asserts that people are not created equal, making reference to "superior people," and stating that he would prefer an economically libertarian dictator to a democratic government that restricted economic freedom. This foreshadowed the unfortunate libertarian support for dictators like Augusto Pinochet, as well as more recent libertarian flirtations with "scientific racist" ideas.

Still, the author of Keynes Hayek credits Hayek with keeping the flame of libertarianism alive through the dark winter of Keynesian dominance, and views the emergence of Milton Friedman as the vindication and apotheosis of Hayek's ideas. In this, I feel that the author makes a major mistake; Friedman's monetarism was a type of macroeconomic management that was more amenable to conservatives of the 1970s and 80s than the type advocated by Keynes, but it was central planning nevertheless (as von Mises pointed out). It was Robert Lucas and Edward Prescott who truly restored Hayekian "classical" economics to dominance in the macro field, with their models of frictionless economies and near-optimal business cycles.

In any case, I definitely recommend Keynes Hayek, especially the audio version.

Jumat, 23 November 2012

Michigan Health Care Claims Tax Fight -- Additional Rounds Ahead

It’s been a tough fight thus far in opposition to the Michigan Health Insurance Claims Assessment Act, which imposes a one percent (1%) assessment on all health care payers, including self-insured employers and certain business partners, for medical services rendered to Michigan residents in the state of Michigan.

As this blog has previously reported, business groups in Michigan signed off on the legislation last year noting it was part of a larger budget deal that was not as bad as possible alternatives.   ERISA preemption concerns were outweighed by the belief that self-insured employers could absorb the new tax without much disruption. 

Then in August of this year, a federal district court in Michigan dismissed an ERISA preemption lawsuit, which contended that the administrative obligations imposed by the Act are unlawful.    

Game over?  Well, not exactly.

An appeal of the District’s court ruling has just by filed with the Sixth Circuit Court Appeals and incorporates some very strong arguments to justify a reversal.  And this time, the self-insurance industry will have an unlikely ally in this legal fight – organized labor. 

What has not been widely recognized is that the tax applies to self-insured Taft-Hartley plans and the ERISA preemption argument is even stronger as it relates to these plans.   So it is a positive development that at least two Taft-Hartley plans are expected file amicus briefs next week. 

But while more pressure is being applied in Federal Court, things are heating back up in the Michigan State Legislature to make the tax significantly more onerous.

The Act was structured based on the assumption that it would raise $400 in annual revenue from all payers.   Of course, government budgeting is often suspect and Michigan bureaucrats have lived up to this reputation.  Through the first half of 2012, the state collected only $109 million from the health claims tax, which means the annualized estimate is short nearly $200 million.

So it should not come as any surprise that the Michigan Legislature is now considering a proposal during a lame duck session to significantly hike the tax.  SB 1359, introduced earlier this month, would allow for an unlimited and variable rate on the claims tax so that it would float up and down to ensure that the tax generates $400 million annually.  The bill would also eliminate the proportional credit/refund provision should the tax collect more than the $400 million target amount.

Interestingly, state business groups who provided tacit approval to the tax last year have now launched an aggressive lobbying effort to defeat the proposed 2.0 version.   We’ll see if labor groups join the cause. 

While it’s certainly encouraging that there is strong push back against SB 1359, the opposition remains focused on the economic argument.    Yes, this is clearly important but arguably not as important as the ERISA preemption issue.

We’ll concede that the most self-insured employers in Michigan have figured out how to comply with this new tax obligation, but multi-state employers will also tell you that if other states implement a similar tax scheme this would greatly complicate compliance efforts.  In turn, this could make the self-insurance option much less attractive – a particularly troubling development in the post-ACA world where self-insurance offers a critical safe harbor.

Look around.  Most states have budget challenges, especially as it relates to health care obligations.  If the Michigan tax withstands legal and legislative challenges then we should not be surprised if other states attempt the same approach.

So the stakes are high in Michigan as it is now ground zero in the ERISA preemption fight.

Rabu, 21 November 2012

Econ grad students and the Macro Wars


In the blog world, there's been some argument as to what the younger generation really thinks about the whole "Macro Wars" thing. Do up-and-coming econ grad students think that the current paradigm needs to be revamped? Do they think macro is basically doing fine? It's tough to tell, because - understandably - most grad students are afraid to get into these academic-political fights (obviously I was one exception, but I'm crazy). But when grad students can speak their minds without fear of consequences, we can see that there is a lot of angst out there over the state of macro - and even over the value of macro itself.

I'm talking, of course, about Econ Job Market Rumors, the anonymous forum. Of course you don't have to be an econ grad student to post at EJMR, but it's hard to imagine that many other people would be interested in the economics job market. If you've ever read EJMR, you'll know that no punches are pulled.

So here's a pretty well-known thread in which the EJMR folks dish their opinions about macro. (The title, "macro no giod p", is an inside-joke meme; I'll let you figure out the meaning for yourself.) A large fraction of the commenters are very critical of the macro field in general, for example:
It's interesting that the fact that their models don't fit does not bother macro economists that much. Whenever a "good" model fails empirically, they just call that a paradox and write hundreds of papers about it.
***
I feel depressed explaining to my friends what I learned in PhD macro . I'm sure most lay people interested in macro would be reallllyyyy disappointed by what is taught and published. But don't fret! You can shrug it off. Just like the students who turn away from macro, lay people too can be dismissed as not sophisticated enough to truly understand the insights of RBCs.
***
[T]he best explanation you [macroeconomists] can come up for business cycles is either 'people are lazy' or a 'negative technology shock'. 
Macro = ideological crap and everything which challenges that view (like ABM) are told that they do not have 'microfoundations' and that's why they are crap. 
Of course, as long as macroeconomists do make the correct predictions they can claim they have the correct explanations, because assumptions do not matter. Oh wait, you even fail on this part. 
To sum it up: Macroeconomists don't know anything about human behavior, how markets work or something about the economy.
***
The biggest puzzle is actually that macroeconomists are so proud about their 'microfoundations' yet they do not understand them at all.
***
I can't wait for the day where econ departments split and leave macro behind, much like physical anthropologists sometimes leave cultural anthropologists behind in their own little circle jerk departments.
***
macro too corrupt
too much black-box
not enough predictive success
too wrong too often
***
macro = ideological bulls**t, should be removed from economics.
***
Oh quit your bellyaching...Nobody likes macroeconomics unless they're a macreconomist. You still have to take it. It's the rite of passage. Just pass your prelim and never look back like the rest of us did. 

A small handful of people in the thread show up to defend macro, but their defenses tend to be very circumspect:
In real life though I find the people who usually make macro no good comments have little to no exposure to modern macro yet have a pretty strong opinion. Its one thing to critique a subject with an understanding of it, then there is a room for intelligent debate. It is anotherthing to dismiss the subject 
Even if you don't like the approach in current macro, macro has difficult questions that are worth asking and answering. Being stupid enough to voice allowed an opinion that macro shouldn't be studied at all means you aren't fit to be an economist. It shames me that some of you are Ph.D's or Ph.D candidates. 
It seems that some of you haven't ever intelligently thought about why the lay person seems to barely realize that there are other fields in economics other than macroeconomics. It is the economics they see as most relevant to them. They do not care about novelty/usefulness of an approach. They care about whether what you have to say is relevant to their understanding of the world, and if it impacts them or those around them. Macroeconomics of fields has the most visible impact on ordinary people and which is why it is a field worth studying.
***
Now you probably learned nothing in substance in a conventional macro-course. You worked through a few seminal papers most of which were written in the 80s and mid 90s (King, Rebelo, Kydland Prescott, gali 1999). You might have looked at Solow 1956 for good measure and some other growth papers from 1970s. The point of that curriculum is to learn the existing approach to dynamic economics. Something you spend little to know time in studying in your mathematics economics courses or first year micro-theory courses. That approach in general can go a long way to explain phenomena around us, even the current crisis. 
You can criticize the approach, but one needs to understand that simply stating the approach is no good isn't any sort of substantive critique. Its unfortunate that few outside of the field have been able to give a real substantive critique, beyond that calibration is wonky and you don't like exogenous shocks. I think most of us realize calibration is wonky, except maybe Prescott. The point of the modern approach is to endogenize as many variables as possible, as that was even more prevalent in the past. (This is really why we ought to teach IS-LM, in grad classes.)

And then a number of people seem to accept that macro field has severe limitations, but still insist that the field is worth studying:
When macro is the subfield with the highest demand for economists, second only to metics? What are you going to do then? Micro theory? 
What you guys don't realize is that in the eyes of the public macro IS economics (and vice versa). Let go of macro and just see enrolment fade and your salaries plummet.
***
Yes. Perhaps that precisely is the problem. The public wants us to do things we aren't very confident with. I must admit, I don't think I would have started in econ if macro wasn't a part of it.
***
I admit macro is no good, but maybe that is why macro is precisely the best subfield for us, since so many questions still lie ahead. What more can we really do in econometrics?
***
I am a macroeconomist too. I decided to work in this area partly because I am interested in the questions, and partly because it is clearly a field where the social marginal product is potentially very high.
***
no one thinks macroeconomics we are doing is that robust. There wouldn't be disagreement in the first place. Its because we lack tools to do good causal inference in the first place. Its nice you can use cross-sectional data or panel data and come-up with an identification strategy as outlined in mostly harmless econometrics. 
We on the other hand have about 4 business cycles worth of auto-correlated time-series data to do most of our inference on. What ever empirical tools are only fit to answer a narrow range of questions. That is why the a toybox economy like DSGE model can catch on in the first place.

(These last two probably best sum up my own views on the topic. Macro has very poor data to work with, and this means we should lower our expectations for the field to some degree; at the same time, the lack of real progress in the field leaves it wide open for innovative thinkers to make a big difference.)

Anyway, I was somewhat surprised at the depth of animosity towards macro among the grad student community. Not only were the anti-macro posts far more numerous, but they received far more likes than dislikes. The same pattern seems to hold elsewhere on EJMR. Non-macro students tend to be very disparaging of macro, and macro students tend to express deep misgivings and reservations about their chosen field. There are, of course, exceptions. But despite a couple retorts of "micro no giod p", there doesn't seem to be nearly the same amount of skepticism directed toward the various micro fields.

I'm not sure what conclusions we can generalize from these anonymous forum posts, or whether EJMR is an accurate barometer of econ grad student sentiment. But the criticism of macro nevertheless was eye-opening, even to a macro-skeptic blogger like myself.


Update: A commenter points me to this thread, where EJMR denizens debate the value of structural estimation. Not really related, but also fun.

Thanksgiving Safety Tips from NFPA

Here is an article from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) on Thanksgiving Safety Tips.  From our family here at Fey Insurance Services to yours, have a wonderful and safe Thanksgiving! 

THANKSGIVING SAFETY TIPS
The kitchen is the heart of the home, especially at Thanksgiving. Kids love to be involved in holiday preparations. Safety in the kitchen is important, especially on Thanksgiving Day when there is a lot of activity and people at home.

Safety tips:


•Stay in the kitchen when you are cooking on the stovetop so you can keep an eye on the food.

•Stay in the home when cooking your turkey and check on it frequently.

•Keep children away from the stove. The stove will be hot and kids should stay 3 feet away.

•Make sure kids stay away from hot food and liquids. The steam or splash from vegetables, gravy or coffee could cause serious burns.

•Keep the floor clear so you don’t trip over kids, toys, pocketbooks or bags.

•Keep knives out of the reach of children.

•Be sure electric cords from an electric knife, coffee maker, plate warmer or mixer are not dangling off the counter within easy reach of a child.

•Keep matches and utility lighters out of the reach of children — up high in a locked cabinet.

•Never leave children alone in room with a lit a candle.

•Make sure your smoke alarms are working. Test them by pushing the test button

Senin, 19 November 2012

Let's have a little chat about inflation...


Inflation is one of those things that almost nobody who isn't an economist seems to understand (though that doesn't mean all economists understand it either!). First of all, there is the fact that most people don't even seem to know what inflation is. Some people seem to equate the word "inflation" with "a decrease in [my] real wages" - if things seem harder to afford, then it must be "inflation". Others seem to think that if stock prices go up, then that is "inflation". Still others use the word "inflation" to describe specific price changes - for example, if oil gets more expensive, people call that "oil price inflation". And the other day, I had a friend tell me: "[It's] simple. Low [interest] rates mean the price of money is low. That's a form of deflation."

(Note that that last statement is the exact opposite of correct. Inflation is a decrease in the value of money. Deflation is an increase in the value of money.)

Or the other day, someone on Twitter asked me: "How is it possible for inflation to help debtors when wages are going down? If wages are going down, doesn't inflation just make it harder for people to pay off their debts?"

The answer is no. Here's why. Suppose you make $50,000 a year and you have $50,000 in debt. Your debt-to-income ratio is 1. Also, just for convenience, let's say the general price level starts out at "1".

Situation A: -50% real wage growth, 100% inflation.
In this case, the new price level is 2. Your new real wage is $25,000. Your new nominal wage is $25,000 x 2 = $50,000. Your debt is still $50,000. Your debt/income ratio is still 1.

Situation B: -50% real wage growth, 0% inflation.
In this case, the new price level is 1. Your new real wage is $25,000. Your new nominal wage is $25,000 x 1 = $25,000. Your debt is still $50,000. Your debt/income ratio is now 2.

Situation C: -50% real wage growth, 50% deflation.
In this case, the new price level is 1/2. Your new real wage is $25,000. Your new nominal wage is $25,000 x 1/2 = $12,500. Your debt is still $50,000. Your debt/income ratio is now 4.

So as you can see, even if your real wage is going down by 50%, it's better to have inflation than no inflation if you are a net debtor. Inflation erodes the value of your debt no matter what is happening to your real wages.

So what's going on here? Why do so many people misunderstand inflation? Maybe it's a form of "Stockholm Syndrome". Inflation-hawkish economists have been bellowing, so loudly and so vehemently, that inflation is Satan - this goes back at least a hundred years - that non-economists just can't help believing it. People end up trying to think up reasons why inflation must be bad after all. When you offer them freedom - when you tell them that sometimes inflation can erode debt, relieve balance sheet recessions, and help stimulate the economy - they don't want to take it. , and they come up with more brilliant ways to identify with their captors. Or something like that.

I don't know. I feel like that's kind of a weak theory. What's really going on here? Why don't most non-economists seem to get what inflation is or what it does?