Rabu, 21 Agustus 2013

Noahpinion becoming Not Quite Noahpinion for Fall 2013



Due to a large build-up of work, I'm taking a break from blogging for this Fall semester. But instead of simply letting Noahpinion gather dust, I'm turning the blog over to a team of young rising stars. Starting 8/24/2013 and ending 12/6/2013, Noahpinion will become Not Quite Noahpinion, and will feature the following awesome brilliant talented bloggers:


Carola Binder

"The Fearless Leader"



Carola Binder is a PhD candidate in economics at UC Berkeley. Her interests include economic expectations formation, economic history, monetary policy, and the Eurozone.


John Aziz

"The Troll Slayer"



John Aziz is an Associate Editor at Pieria and a freelance economics writer. His interests include monetary policy, finance, techno-optimism, trolling, and funny pictures of animals. He is the only person in the universe to have contributed guest blogs to both Zero Hedge and Noahpinion.


Yichuan Wang

"The Wunderkind"



Yichuan Wang is an undergraduate economics and mathematics student at the University of Michigan. His interests include data visualization, monetary policy, and the Chinese economy. He frequently does research with Miles Kimball, and also writes articles for Quartz.


Josiah Neely

"The Professional"



"By day I am a policy analyst at the Texas Public Policy Foundation in Austin, Texas. In my spare time I plot world domination (doesn't everyone?)."


Jeremie Cohen-Setton

"The Dark Horse"


Jeremie Cohen-Setton (@JCSBruegel) is a PhD candidate in economics at UC Berkeley and an Affiliate Fellow at Bruegel. He specializes in Macroeconomic Policies and Macroeconomic History and worked previously as an economist at HM Treasury and at Goldman Sachs. Jeremie blogs at ecbwatchers.org and is the main author of the blogs review at bruegel.org.


Peter Dorman

"The Guru"



Peter Dorman teaches economics and other things at Evergreen State College in Olympia, Washington, works as a consultant on environmental, health and development issues, and hikes whenever the rain lets up. His introductory textbooks, micro and macro, will be published early next year by Springer.


Guan Yang

"NOT a Teen Golfer"



Guan Yang is a graduate student living in New York. Before that, he grew up in Denmark, where he, among other things, wrote mass email marketing software and calculated option adjusted spreads for mortgage backed bonds (in the 40-100 bps range). He is interested in everything except most sports.




They will be joined in October by Peter Dorman of EconoSpeak.

So keep reading Not Quite Noahpinion! In the meantime, if you absolutely need my witty commentary, you can follow me on Twitter at @noahpinion. And of course I'll see y'all after the semester is done.

A few words about math


One more unhinged rant before I turn the blog over to the Not Quite Noahpinion super-team.

When I was 15, I had an epiphany that changed my life. I had always been pretty good at math, but I found it boring. Who cared about all these abstract numbers? There was no pleasure in it for me. Even when you calculated the area of a back yard that could be enclosed by a certain length of fence, or whatever, it just seemed like an analogy, designed to make a boring pointless subject more interesting by relating it to something "real". Still boring. Despite teachers' entreaties, I never joined the math team in high school.

Then I took my first physics class. Flipping through the book, I groaned. There was so much boring math! But when I sighed and finally sat down to read the first chapter, the author told me an amazing thing. Math, he wrote, was the "language of nature". It could be used to represent reality. Those abstract numbers on the page weren't just something we made up; they were real things. At first I didn't even quite get what he was saying! Then I worked an example, using projectile motion to calculate the range of a cannonball. I suddenly imagined that I was a Turkish gunner, lobbing iron balls at the walls of Constantinople (yes, even then I was a history geek). Not realizing that gunners actually found their range by trial and error, or that the conquest of Constantinople came well before Galileo and Newton, I suddenly thought: "If I could do this simple math, I could hit the wall really accurately! But if I did the math wrong, I'd miss!" All at once, it hit me: Math could predict the future. Math conveyed power.

Math was real.

(Of course, later we confirmed the model's usefulness by predicting - very accurately! - a real metal ball in a real lab. But I was already sold on the concept.)

From then on I steadily began to enjoy math more. Eventually I discovered the abstract "beauty" that mathematicians talk about, especially when it came to proofs. But when I did physics math, there was always a special thrill that other math never held for me. It was the idea that I was mastering the real Universe with my abstract mind.

Fast-forward a few years later, and I had left physics behind (despite enjoying it and being good at it). When I entered econ grad school, I expected - naively, it turned out - that the math that people did would be like the math I had done in physics. I expected that economists' models would largely be reliable, well-tested tools for predicting the future, just like I had predicted the cannonball with high school algebra.

And actually, some of the econ math seemed to qualify. Game theory only annoyed me slightly. Though its assumptions weren't often satisfied in the real world, seemed like it would work if we could get the incentives right (and in fact, it very often does, in experiments). Consumer theory was a little more dubious - how could you measure a demand curve in practice? - but choice theory seemed like something that would work if people had stable preferences and you could nail them down empirically. I was a little disturbed by the misuse of the word "axiom" to refer to things that were actually testable (like revealed preference), but I let that one slide.

But macro was a different story.

In macro, most of the equations that went into the model seemed to just be assumed. In physics, each equation could be - and presumably had been - tested and verified as holding more-or-less true in the real world. In macro, no one knew if real-world budget constraints really were the things we wrote down. Or the production function. No one knew if this "utility" we assumed people maximized corresponded to what people really maximize in real life. We just assumed a bunch of equations and wrote them down. Then we threw them all together, got some kind of answer or result, and compared the result to some subset of real-world stuff that we had decided we were going to "explain". Often, that comparison was desultory or token, as in the case of "moment matching".

In other words, the math was no longer real. It was all made up. You could no longer trust the textbook. When the textbook told you that "Households maximize the expected value of their discounted lifetime utility of consumption", that was not a Newton's Law that had been proven approximately true with centuries of physics experiments. It was not even a game theory solution concept that had been proven approximately sometimes true with decades of economics experiments. Instead, it was just some random thing that someone made up and wrote down because A) it was tractable to work with, and B) it sounded plausible enough so that most other economists who looked at it tended not to make too much of a fuss.

We were told not to worry about this. We were told that although macro needed microfoundations - absolutely required them - it was not necessary for the reality of any of these microfoundations to be independently confirmed by evidence. All that was necessary is that the model "worked" after all the microfoundations were thrown together. We were told this not because of any individual failing on the part of any of our teachers, but because this belief is part of the dominant scientific culture of the macro field. It's the paradigm.

Anyway, that was the beginning of my exposure to macro, but not by any means the end. The math got a lot hairier and more kludgey, though not more beautiful. Only occasionally - in a special class taught by Miles Kimball - was there the kind of elegance or deep conceptual math that I had enjoyed in college math classes. Only occasionally - as in the "matching function" of a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides labor search model - was there a microfoundation that people actually bothered to check rigorously against reality. Usually, the math was just a whole lot of algebra (yawn) with more made-up stuff. Kreps-Porteus preferences. Heterogeneous agent models. Investment adjustment costs. You would very formally define an "equilibrium" in terms of some functional equations, and you'd stick the system in a computer to solve for you, tossing in parameters from wherever you could grab them ("calibration"). 

So the math in most of the macro papers I read was easy math, implemented in a boring, kludgey, tedious way. That would have been OK if I could have convinced myself that the math represented real stuff like in physics. But mostly, it seemed not to.

It occurred to me then that there were more uses of math than the ones I had been taught about in high school. In addition to being beautiful and representing reality, math can be used to signal intelligence. Economists hold forth on a lot of stuff, and we often tend to listen to the ones we think are smartest. If I can do some tricks that the next guy can't, that can make me seem more like a sage. "First prove you're smart by doing some hard math thing," an economics prof once told me with a grin, "and then you can write about whatever you want." I doubt most profs are so cynical, but the incentive system is certainly there. 

Math can also be used as obscurantism; if every paper in a field starts with a dense thicket of formal statements and functional equations, it will be difficult for even very smart outsiders to come in and evaluate what the people in a field are doing with their time. Again, I doubt all but the most cynical macroeconomists would be intentionally obscurantist; they would just be subtly rewarded for doing things that ended up having an obscurantist result.

Anyway, the thick, sludgy swamp of math-without-beauty-or-truth ended up discouraging me from doing math at all. My dissertation didn't really use anything beyond high-school algebra, and was all about experiments and empirics instead of theory. But I miss math. I miss doing cool, deep, beautiful math for its own sake. But much more than that, I miss doing math that felt like it represented something real.

Luckily, Stony Brook is very strong in quantitative finance, so I'm getting to explore that field more. Despite the, um, well-known dangers of putting quant finance into practice, the math - and its relation to reality - is considerably more to my liking than the stuff I did in grad school.

(Note: The purpose of this post is not to say that economists shouldn't use math, or should use less. Check out this older post to see what I think about that broader question. Here I'm just saying that the math of macroeconomics is unappealing to me personally.)


Update: Paul Krugman points out that macro math is also useful for clarifying your thinking, checking your self-consistency, and exploring the implications of various sets of assumptions. That's all true, of course, and in fact I wrote much the same thing in this post last year. But those things just don't give me the same rush of intellectual excitement that the reality of physics math (or the beauty of pure math) always gave me. Others' mileage may vary.

Also, Paul suggests that my macro teachers might have really believed that their models were The Truth. Although some might have, I think most (I had 8 in all!) simply wanted to give students the technical tools that they thought we needed in order to succeed and publish papers in the macro world. In general I think they did a very good job in that regard.


Update 2: Bryan Caplan thinks that there's too much math in econ, period (and not just macro). He says that "economath" is often just a tedious and unnecessary translation of economic intuition into math-language. Interesting, and worth a read. But again, this is getting a bit far from my point in this post, which is about how fun economath is(n't) for me, not how useful it is for the world.

Selasa, 20 Agustus 2013

Learn to stop worrying and love (moderate) inflation



The Federal Reserve's unprecedented programs of Quantitative Easing have not, as many predicted, resulted in substantially increased inflation. But I view this as a failure of the policy, not a success.

Inflation is grossly underappreciated. Economists consistently fail to educate the public about what they mean by the term "inflation". People think it just means "a rise in the price of something" (though that's not really what it means). And people don't like prices rising, because it seems like it should make stuff more expensive - and who wants that?

We're told that inflation is a necessary cost of improving the economy. And in fact, that's exactly what monetarist macroeconomists (think of Mike Woodford, Miles Kimball, etc.) tell us that it is. We must accept higher inflation, they tell us, in order to also get better GDP growth. But given our 'druthers, they tell us, we'd rather have very low inflation. No one wants to become like Zimbabwe, or the Weimar Republic, right??

I'm not so sure this is true, and I'll explain why later. But first, let me dispel a couple of popular myths about inflation.


Popular Inflation Myth 1: "Inflation means I can't buy as much stuff."

Wrong. Remember, inflation is an increase in the overall price level. But when the price of everything goes up, your wage should rise as well. Why? Because on average, we are all sellers of something. If you work in a tea shop and the price of tea goes up, your wage can be expected to go up as well, and so forth. Remember, every dollar that one person spends becomes the income of another person!

So when prices go up, wages should go up as well. Read this paper. The authors find that "higher prices lead to higher wage growth".

Of course, wages are affected by other things besides inflation - for example, labor's share of total income. So "price inflation" and "wage inflation" aren't exactly the same. But they tend to be similar:



(source.)

Economists have a term for how much you can buy with your wages. It's called the "real wage". Real wages are wages AFTER accounting for inflation. So to look at how much you can buy, don't look at inflation, look at your real wage. Your real wage tells you your real cost of living; inflation does not.

To see that inflation doesn't reduce your real wage, just think about Weimar Germany. Prices went up by a factor of one trillion. But people did not starve en masse as a result. Remember that guy with the wheelbarrow full of cash, going to buy bread? HOW DO YOU THINK HE GOT HIS HANDS ON A WHEELBARROW OF CASH IN THE FIRST PLACE? The answer: That was not his life's savings. He did not sell the family farm. He had a wheelbarrow full of cash because as prices skyrocketed, wages skyrocketed too!

"But don't employers take advantage of inflation to screw over workers and make them take wage cuts?"

Maybe. People don't pay close attention to inflation when it's low, and so a small amount of inflation can allow employers to cut real wages without people noticing. (Actually, some economists who want "wage flexibility" like a small amount of inflation for exactly this reason.)

But for larger amounts of inflation, no. When inflation gets big, people start noticing, and demanding higher wages. See the paper I linked to earlier for proof. Also, check out historical U.S. inflation:



Check out those huge inflation spikes in the 1910s and 1940s! But workers got much richer in those decades.

Anyway, once more: Inflation does not make your real wage fall.


Popular Inflation Myth 2: "Inflation punishes savers."

This one is partly right. Surprise inflation punishes past savers, because inflation redistributes wealth from creditors (past savers) to debtors (past borrowers). But in the future, interest rates will adjust to take inflation into account. That's called the Fisher Equation:

i \approx r + \pi

So if inflation goes up (and if it's a surprise), future savers will be OK, because they will demand - and get - higher interest rates.



OK, so there are the popular myths. What about the benefits of inflation?


Inflation Benefit 1: Your debt goes away.


Chances are, if you're young and have a mortgage (and maybe some car loans too), you are almost certainly a net borrower. Even if you have some savings, they are probably outweighed by the mortgage. Which means that inflation makes you richer. Remember, surprise inflation helps debtors and hurts creditors. Who are debtors? Mostly the young and the poor. Who are creditors? Mostly the old and the rich.

Now you hopefully see why many conservatives don't like inflation!



Inflation Benefit 2: The federal government debt goes away. 


All that scary federal government debt! Slows down economic growth, right? Well realize that when there's inflation, the value of the federal government's debt erodes, just like your mortgage! Debt stays the same in $ terms, but nominal GDP goes up, so the debt-to-GDP ratio goes down! That high inflation in the postwar era is exactly how we got rid of our huge World War 2 debt.

And remember that today's government debt is tomorrow's taxes. Inflation therefore reduces the size of your future taxes. Inflation is a future tax cut! Remember, inflation means the value of a U.S. dollar goes down. But the dollar value of the debt does not change. So inflation allows you to pay off your share of the government debt with "funny money"! Awesome, right?


Inflation Benefit 3 (?): "Balance sheet recession" might go away!

Lots of people believe that the U.S. and other rich countries are experiencing sluggish growth because they are still "deleveraging" - in other words, reducing their total stock of gross debt. Now, that's a controversial theory. But if it's true, it means that inflation would help America deleverage and get back on its feet faster. Essentially, inflation is a partial debt jubilee.



Now, I have to be fair, so I should mention that of course inflation has its costs as well. One of these is the pure nuisance cost - constantly changing prices is a nuisance, and that nuisance can become extremely economically damaging in a hyperinflation. Second, high inflation leads to variable inflation, increasing uncertainty and depressing investment. And finally there might even be government moral hazard; if the government decides it can simply inflate away its debt, it might engage in more irresponsible spending. These costs are all especially severe for higher levels of inflation.

But anyway I hope, after reading this, that you will be a little more wary of all those warnings about the evils of inflation. stop listening to poorly informed politicians, "Austrian" forum trolls, and your uncle who thinks he's still in the 70s. Inflation does not rob the poor man of his hard-earned wages; in fact, it is more likely to unburden the poor man from his crippling debt. And inflation helps get rid of all that debt, both public and private, that many people believe is clogging up our economic system. 

We don't want to let inflation get out of hand. But a higher Fed inflation target for the next decade - say, 4% or 5%, instead of our current 2% - would probably be a good thing for most Americans.


Update: Finance blogger Mish Shedlock responds to this post with quite a bit of spluttering.

Senin, 19 Agustus 2013

Risk is immeasurable



Everyone (hopefully) knows there are many measures of risk in financial markets. The most commonly used example is volatility, but if your returns are skewed, you might want to focus only on the lower tail of the distribution, and if your losses are fat-tailed, you might want to use something like the Conditional Tail Expectation. But no matter what measure you use, you can't really measure risk.

Before I say why, let me contrast risk with something you sometimes can sort of measure: return. Actually, measuring return is very hard, because to measure the overall return of your portfolio, you have to measure the value of your assets. And that's hard. Just think of American banks, when they tried to value their mortgage-backed assets in the middle of the financial crisis. It was nearly impossible to mark assets to market, because there was no market - no one was buying. But "mark to model", i.e. using some theory to value the assets, was no better; it was rightly denigrated as "mark to myth".

As if that weren't enough, there's also the matter of price impact or slippage. When you try to sell stuff, the price will tend to change. That's a transaction cost, and it's an unpredictable transaction cost. So if I have a hundred tons of gold, it's hard to know how much I could get for that gold if I sold it all, even if I know the current price.

But if you liquidate all your investments, you can get cash, and since cash is the unit in which we denominate value (no "money is a bubble" stuff, please!), you can know your nominal return in that case...unless you count non-salable assets like human capital in your "portfolio", of course. And your real return, which depends on future inflation, is never quite calculable.

But compared to risk, return is peanuts to measure. Why? Because risk is all about counterfactuals.

Return can't be known in advance, obviously, but if you can mark to market and if you ignore price impact, you can measure your return after the fact. Not so with risk. Risk not only can't be known in advance, it can't be known in retrospect either. Suppose I buy GM stock, hold it for a year, and then sell. How much risk did I incur over that period? First of all...who cares? It's over and done. But even if I did care, I couldn't know, because what actually happened to my asset reveals little about what might have happened.

For example, the realized volatility of the asset over that holding period tells me little. First of all, it didn't end up mattering for my eventual return. Second of all, I might have been able to time the ups and downs, buying when it was cheap or selling when expensive. And knowing how likely I would have been to successfully time the returns is incredibly difficult.

But also, the realized volatility doesn't tell us how likely volatility was to change over that period. See, volatility changes. Over at his blog Keplerian Finance, Stony Brook applied math prof and long-time hedge-fund maestro Robert Frey does a quick calculation of S&P volatility, and identifies what look like distinct regimes. He bins them up into the following picture:

gSP500VolatilityRegimes001

As you can see, volatility is mostly constant, but has a few extremely spiky spikes. Whatever is causing those spikes, they're too rare and too irregular to get a good idea of how likely you are to hit a spike in any given year.

So suppose your GM stock didn't have a ton of volatility over the year in which you held it. No spikes. But what were the chances of one of those spikes happening over that year? You don't really know. So that means you don't really know if whatever return you ended up making was justified by the risk.

You'll never know how closely you dodged a bullet.

One interpretation of this is that there's always true Knightian uncertainty in the world. Another is that there's only risk (i.e. probabilities are fixed), but we'll always have great difficulty estimating it from data. The difference is mostly philosophical; effectively, those are the same thing. Andrew Lo goes into a lot more depth on the topic in this famous paper.

Now this doesn't mean we can know nothing about risk. Obviously we can know something about it - measures like volatility or conditional tail expectation are useful. But not only will we never know everything about risk, we'll never know how much we know about it; at any time, our quantitative measures of risk might be getting more informative or less informative, as Frey's graph shows pretty clearly.

So how should we react to the unknowability of risk? Should we simply assume that the "true" distribution is so fat-tailed that we should avoid taking chances as much as possible? Probably not, since over many stretches of time, people who assume that "true" risk is small (distributions are thin-tailed) will sometimes end up being correct for a very long time. And for that very long time, the risk-ignorers will prosper much more than the risk-suspecters.

In fact, there is no optimal solution. Sometimes we'll guess there's more risk than there actually is, and sometimes we'll guess less. And we'll never know which of our guesses were right, or whether we just dodged a bullet we never saw.

Sabtu, 17 Agustus 2013

The Neoliberal Choice



Hiroko Tabuchi, writing in the NYT, shows us what a non-liberalized labor market looks like in the modern world:
[There is] an intensifying battle over hiring and firing practices in Japan, where lifetime employment has long been the norm and where large-scale layoffs remain a social taboo... 
Sony wants to change that, and so does Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. As Japan’s economic recovery slows, reducing the restraints on companies has become even more important to Mr. Abe’s economic plans. He wants to loosen rigid rules on job terminations for full-time staff... 
Labor practices in Japan contrast sharply with those in the United States, where companies are quick to lay off workers when demand slows or a product becomes obsolete. It is cruel to the worker, but it usually gives the overall economy agility... 
Critics of labor changes say something more important is at stake. They warn that making it easier to cut jobs would destroy Japan’s social fabric for the sake of corporate profits, causing mass unemployment and worsening income disparities. For a country that has long prided itself on stability and relatively equitable incomes, such a change would be unacceptable. 
It would be a radical change. A combination of lifetime employment, seniority-based pay and intense worker loyalty to the company was credited for Japan’s postwar economic miracle, as stability and growth went hand in hand. But when the Japanese economy stumbled in the early 1990s, companies found that Japan’s rigid labor practices made downsizing impractical... 
Proponents of employment change point out that stiff protections for workers have prompted companies to make major cuts in hiring, shrinking opportunities for scores of younger Japanese.
Mark Ames, never one to mince words, replied on Twitter:
NYTimes rehashes same old anti-labor libertarian bullshit..."Economists say... flexibility to labor market...compete"...NYT: What Japan needs to do is listen to what "economists say." And ain't it grand that crypto-fascist Abe is anti-labor neoliberal...The same neoliberal crap, same Soviet-like propaganda "flexibility" "bloated" "compete" NYT used in 1990s...Those code words are loaded with all sorts of discredited neoliberal market theory assumptions[.]
So maybe it's all a lie? Maybe liberalized labor markets don't help any economy in any way? Maybe the choice Tabuchi depicts - between security and dynamism - is a false one?

The truth is: We'll never know. That's how history works. But it's certainly true that the U.S.took a far more neoliberal (laissez-faire) route in the 80s, 90s, and 2000s. The different paths taken by Japan and the U.S. are a sort of "natural experiment", if an imperfect one. It's hard to know which of the present-day differences between the two countries can be chalked up to this divergent path. But we can at least make some educated guesses.

It's true that Japan is a more equal society than the U.S., though less equal than West and Central Europe. It's also true that Japan has a lower unemployment rate, though that may just be due to different ways of defining "unemployment"; Japan has a lower labor force participation rate than the U.S., though part of that is due to age structure). And Japanese corporate profits have traditionally been lower than American profits.

But Japan's heavily restricted labor market and its government protections against hostile takeovers have not saved it from a declining labor share of national income, nor from steadily falling wages, nor from steadily rising inequality.

And it seems to me that these rigid labor market protections and corporate legal and regulatory protections have imposed some real and serious costs on Japanese society. First of all, Japanese total factor productivity has essentially flatlined since the late 80s, performing much worse than TFP in America or even Europe. 

That's what economists mean when they use words like "flexibility". It means that Japanese people can only maintain their rich standard of living by working insane amounts of unpaid overtime. That in turn means that many men in Japan can only see their families on the weekends. Those are real human costs.

Now maybe that productivity flatline is due entirely to other factors. But the evidence says that Japanese companies that are kept on life support by the government (directly, or indirectly through big banks) are responsible for a decent-sized chunk of the stagnation (here's another study and yet another study that agree). Are those studies are done by mendacious neoliberal economists with an axe to grind? Maybe, I guess! But until someone shows me some different results, I'm going to go with the best guess of the people who study this stuff (I also checked the methodology of two of the papers and found it generally sound, though these things are always hard to say.)
But it seems to me that the cost of Japan's refusal to embrace neoliberalism go beyond lack of "flexibility". I think that Japan's labor-protectionism has caused deep unfairness to persist in Japanese society. Japan is still one of the lowest-ranking countries in terms of women's equality. Go into a lot of Japanese companies, and you still see the men climbing the corporate ladder while the women serve tea. That cozy boys' club is protected by the government, which makes it incredibly difficult to fire the mostly-male "正社員" (lifetime) employees, while making it incredibly easy to fire the mostly-female "契約社員" (contract) and "アルバイト" (part-time) employees. It really still is Mad Men in much of corporate Japan. (And did I mention the fact that female labor force participation in Japan in under 50%?)

And speaking of those different tiers of workers, Japan's protected, restricted labor market seems to be creating an enduring class division. If you manage to grab one of those "正社員" (lifetime) jobs, you're set - say hello to job security, guaranteed pay raises. But if you miss that bus, and end up as a "契約社員" (contract employee) or "アルバイト" (part-time employee), you're screwed. It's very very difficult to get a "lifetime" job if you've ever worked at a "contract" or "part-time" job - in other words, say hello to a lifetime of low wages, job insecurity, and menial servitude. Now, realize that most Japanese workers are hired either right out of college or right out of high school (if you take a "gap year", you're toast). So that one first job will determine your entire future.

In the past, about a fifth of Japanese people age 15-24 failed to get "lifetime" jobs, and many of those were women who - for better or worse - would end up dropping out of the labor force when they got married. Today the figure stands at about half, and now a substantial number of those (for better or worse) are men. Japan's rigid labor market risks creating a permanent underclass.

Like I said, we'll never know for certain whether Japan could have prevented this troubling state of affairs through methods other than neoliberalism. And I'm not saying Japan's system sucks - the dignity, security, and high standard of living enjoyed by Japan's "lifetime" employees, and by their wives and children, is real. But looking at the U.S., I see that despite all our economic woes, women have achieved a measure of equality, your first job out of college does not determine your life, and lots of people don't have to work 20 hours a week of unpaid overtime just to afford a first-world standard of living.

There are lots of good policy steps Japan could take that have nothing to do with labor market liberalization or the dismantling of corporate protections. But it seems to me that the choice Hiroko Tabuchi presents is very real. It can't be waved away. Japan really does have to choose: neoliberalism and "flexibility", or corporatism and continued social and economic rigidity. It's not an easy choice.


Update: As a number of commenters have pointed out, neoliberalism vs. corporatism is not a binary choice. You can have some of each, just like you can go to the grocery store and buy some eggs and some milk. The point of this post is that there is a real tradeoff between the two. Anyway, the truth is, Japan has already chosen to take a few steps in the direction of neoliberalism. A friend who works in Japan in private equity writes:
I'd point out that the Japanese labor market is already in the process of becoming more flexible, although slowly. A few points that come to mind: 
A. Rise of the IT industry
Now, IT companies such as Rakuten, Yahoo Japan, DeNA, GREE, NRI and so on are creating a huge number of jobs, and these companies don't offer a life-long employment nor hire you necessarily out of college. This is partly because the IT services industry is a more skill-oriented field and thus people can easily move between companies, while Japanese traditional large corporations still tend to nurture "generalists" (i.e. the value of employees in those companies is "knowing the system/culture of their company"), and hence those generalists are usually useless once they move out of the company that they joined out of college. So the rise of IT service industry is changing the employment custom to some extent. 
B. Legislative changes in the staffing service industry
The Staffing service industry offers contract employees to many corporations. Due to the legislative deregulation of the Temporary Staffing Services Law in 1996, 1999 and 2004, the number of contract employees has hugely increased. This was partly in response to increased pressure from the business sector after the burst of the economic bubble... But as you know, after the GFC in 2008, criticism against this staffing service industry is intensifying... 
C. Lay-offs at Japan Inc.
These last few years, many major Japanese companies ("Japan Inc"s) such as Sony, Panasonic, Sharp, NEC, among others, haven't been performing well and had to lay-off a few workers. This was a big shock for those who are employed by these companies. Not only are those manufacturing companies losing their competitive edge, but also Japanese big banks with solid balance sheets cannot employ all their people forever - they typically kick out many people in their 40s and send them to client companies (this is possible because Japanese banks still have huge power over their borrower companies). Those people's salary will typically be cut in half...  

Jumat, 16 Agustus 2013

New Quartz column: How to get into an econ PhD program



Miles Kimball and I have a new column up at Quartz, entitled "The complete guide to getting into an economics PhD program". Here's a teaser:
Back in May, Noah wrote about the amazingly good deal that is the PhD in economics... 
Of course, such a good deal won’t last long now that the story is out, so you need to act fast! Since he wrote his post, Noah has received a large number of emails asking the obvious follow-up question: “How do I get into an econ PhD program?” And Miles has been asked the same thing many times by undergraduates and other students at the University of Michigan. So here, we present together our guide for how to break into the academic Elysium called Econ PhD Land... 
Chances are, if you’re asking for advice, you probably feel unprepared in one of two ways. Either you don’t have a sterling math background, or you have quantitative skills but are new to the field of econ. Fortunately, we have advice for both types of applicant... 
Anyway, if you want to have intellectual stimulation and good work-life balance, and a near-guarantee of a well-paying job in your field of interest, an econ PhD could be just the thing for you. Don’t be scared of the math and the jargon. We’d love to have you.

Read on for the complete guide!

Update: At his blog, Miles adds some very important info about the financial costs of grad school, and how to minimize them.

Update: Jeff "Econjeff" Smith, whose office is right next to Miles', offers additional advice on getting in. Check it out!

Rabu, 14 Agustus 2013

The cruel trick played by history on Milton Friedman



Well, everyone is talking about this, so...

Paul Krugman wrote a blog post saying that Milton Friedman's influence has been largely forgotten in macro policy debates. Steve Williamson lists a number of ways in which Friedman's influence is central to modern macro. Williamson has the right of it; Friedman's ideas are deeply embedded in the macro theories we use to think about stabilization policy. Furthermore - and Williamson doesn't say this - almost all of our macro policy discussions these days center around Quantitative Easing, a tool popularized, and arguably invented, by Friedman.

Three later posts by Krugman (post 1, post 2, post 3) get it right, I think. Friedman hasn't disappeared from policy discourse; he's disappeared from right-wing policy discourse.

Friedman's ideas are pretty close to the mainstream New Keynesian idea of the macroeconomy - the kind of thing promoted by Mike Woodford, Smets and Wouters, Greg Mankiw, and Miles Kimball. New Keynesian models use consumption smoothing, monetary policy rules, and a NAIRU with a downward-sloping short-run Phillips curve - all Friedman ideas. And in New Keynesian models, monetary policy reigns supreme; only at the zero lower bound is monetary policy possibly ineffective. That's a very Friedman idea too. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the policy of Quantitative Easing - which takes us beyond the New Keynesian framework - was what Friedman explicitly suggested for Japan.

Now notice that Quantitative Easing, and the Fed in general, are reviled by the American right. Rick Perry famously threatened to do physical harm to Ben Bernanke for "printing more money". Ron and Rand Paul are famous for decrying QE and Bernanke, as are right-wing darlings like Peter Schiff. Bernanke is as devoted a Friedman disciple as exists.

Meanwhile, more sober conservative economist types, like Martin Feldstein and Allan Meltzer, are also extremely dubious of QE. And of course the Wall Street Journal is forever warning about the dangers of inflation from the policy.

So the American right, whether of the populist fire-breathing type or the staid, WSJ type, despises the ideas of Milton Friedman. What they support looks a lot closer to "Austrian" economics, which Friedman explicitly denigrated.

But the right frequently uses and abuses the name of Milton Friedman. People like Rand Paul seem to identify Friedman with the concept of hard money. This is probably because Friedman was known for opposing inflationary policy in the 70s. The right remembers that policy position, but has no concept of the theory that underlie it. (They also probably remember Friedman's libertarian-conservative political leanings, and his debates with Old Keynesians like Tobin.)

Actually, a funny true story of the Friedman (Tom, not Milton) variety: I was taking a taxi back from the 2013 AEA Meeting, and the taxi driver told me that we needed to "stop all this government money printing" and "go back to the policies of Milton Friedman". including "going back on the gold standard". I told him that Friedman invented Quantitative Easing, and said the Depression could have been prevented by printing money and going off the gold standard. He refused to believe me.

So essentially, the right thinks Friedman was an Austrian! This is pretty much confirmed by the fact that Rand Paul's first choice for Fed chair would be Friedrich Hayek, and his second choice would be Friedman.

I can only imagine how Friedman must be turning in his grave. His academic legacy is probably what he would have wanted...but his political legacy has been to be conflated with some of his most bitter intellectual opponents, to have their ideas ascribed to him, and to have his own ideas reviled by the people on his own side of the political spectrum. It's as if Ronald Reagan were to be remembered mainly as a proponent of tax increases and Soviet appeasement, simply because he raised taxes in 1982 and signed arms control treaties with the USSR.

The moral of this story should be clear to all economists: If you choose to get involved in politics and public policy debates, your position in those debates will determine your popular legacy, and your academic ideas will be remembered only in academia. That is the price you will inevitably pay.